


Chapter 6: Specifying Requirements


Abenezer Taye

Apr 20, 2022




Safety Standards

- The verification process looks like:



- **Design requirement documents:** describe the **capabilities, functions, and operations** of a system.
- **Safety standards:** provide guidelines and processes for developing safety-critical systems
- **DO-178C:** a standard given by FAA for determining and certifying the airworthiness of aviation software

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Safety Standards

- **DO-178C:** Has five assurance levels for software modules (aka Design Assurance Levels (DALs))
- Categorizes failure conditions by their effects on the aircraft, crew, and passenger.
- Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MC/DC) is a test suite that requires
 1. Each entry and exit point in the code be invoked
 2. Each decision take every possible value
 3. Each condition in a decision take every possible value

Design Assurance Levels (DALs) and Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs).

DAL	Failure condition	Code coverage requirements	ASIL
A	Catastrophic	MC/DC unit tests with independence, branch, functional, call, and statement coverage	N/A
B	Hazardous	Branch and statement coverage with independence, MC/DC highly recommended	ASIL D
C	Major	Statement coverage, MC/DC unit tests, branch coverage recommended	ASIL B/C
D	Minor	Statement coverage, Branch coverage recommended	ASIL A
E	No safety effect		N/A

Safety Standards


- **ISO 26262**: a standard governing the functional safety of electronic and software components in road vehicles

- Has four Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) based on exposure to issues that affect the controllability of the vehicle

$$ASIL = (Exposure \times Controllability) \times Severity$$

- Divides probabilities of **exposure** into **four** classes very low (E1) → high (E4)
- **Four** classes to rate **controllability** → “controllable” to “difficult to control”
- **Four** classes to rate **severity** → “No injuries” to “Fatal injuries”

- A component that must be relied upon in a situation that has a **medium probability of occurrence**, and is considered **normally controllable** but can result in **life-threatening injuries** → requires an **ASIL of B**



Challenges of safety standards

- Safety standards are useful for dealing with many potential design and implementation defects.
 - However, research shows many areas of autonomous systems are not covered by existing standards
- The role of human effort in the task of verification and validation
 - Encoding the requirements and models in a verification tool
 - Validating the models (checking that the models indeed correspond to the real system)
 - Interpreting the output results of the verification tool
- There is no agreed-upon definition for precisely accounting for these human efforts



Safety requirements

- **Invariant:** captures the idea that “some things always hold” or equivalently, “bad things never happen”.
- A candidate invariant I is an invariant if all states along all executions of A satisfy I

$$\forall \alpha \in \text{Execs}_{\mathcal{A}}, \forall t, \alpha(t) \in I.$$

- **Progress requirements:** captures the idea that “something good eventually happens”
- Automaton A is said to meet progress requirement if every execution of A eventually reaches P .


$$\forall \alpha \in \text{Execs}_{\mathcal{A}}, \exists t, \alpha(t) \in P.$$

- A more meaningful version of progress is captured by **asymptotic stability** \rightarrow requires all executions of A to converge to P as time goes to infinity.
- A stronger version of progress bounds the time within which P must be achieved

$$\forall \alpha \in \text{Execs}_{\mathcal{A}}, \exists t \leq T_P, \alpha(t) \in P,$$

Formal Languages to specifying requirements

- **Temporal Logics:** a family of formal languages for succinctly specifying complex requirements
- **Temporal** refers to the sequential ordering of certain actions or predicates in the execution of an automaton



- **Branching logics:** allow quantification over execution (Computational Tree Logic (CTL))
- **Linear logics:** do not allow quantification over execution (Linear Temporal Logic (LTL))

Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)

- Consider the program


```
While (x<3){
  print ("hello")
  if (x==1) print ("hi");
  if (x==2) x=0;
  else x++;
}
```

Atomic Propositions

$p \rightarrow$ "prints hello"
 $q \rightarrow$ "prints hi"
 $r \rightarrow$ "x is even"

Temporal Patterns

- Always p holds
- Always p implies (q or r)
- Never (q and r) holds
- Always eventually q holds



- LTL semantics

- \neg (not), \vee (or), \wedge (and), \rightarrow (implies) are **propositional connectives**
- \circ (X)(next), \diamond (F)(eventually), \square (G)(always), (U) (until) are **temporal connectives**

$\neg, \circ, \diamond, \square$ are **unary connectives** (have high precedence than binary connectives)
 $\vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, U$ are **binary connectives**

Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)

- \neg (*not*), \vee (*or*), \wedge (*and*), \rightarrow (*implies*) are propositional connectives
- \circ (*X*) (*next*), \diamond (*F*) (*eventually*), \square (*G*) (*always*), (U) are temporal connectives

Temporal Patterns

- Always p holds ($\square p$)
- Always p implies (q or r) ($\square p \rightarrow (q \vee r)$)
- Never (q and r) holds ($\neg(q \wedge r)$)
- Always eventually q holds ($\square \diamond q$)

Example: It is always the case that, when a lift is at the 2nd floor, travels upwards and the 5th floor is requested, it will not change direction until the 5th floor is reached.

$\square (@2 \wedge \text{upgoing} \wedge \text{pressed5} \rightarrow (\text{upgoing } U @5))$

- **Key assumption in LTL:** for every state on the path, assume to know which atomic statements are true in that state
- Formal semantics

$\mathbf{v} \models \text{true}$	$\iff \text{true}$
$\mathbf{v} \models p$	$\iff p \in \text{Lab}(q)$
$\mathbf{v} \models \neg f$	$\iff \mathbf{v} \not\models f$
$\mathbf{v} \models f_1 \wedge f_2$	$\iff \mathbf{v} \models f_1 \text{ and } \mathbf{v} \models f_2$
$\mathbf{v} \models f_1 \vee f_2$	$\iff \mathbf{v} \models f_1 \text{ or } \mathbf{v} \models f_2$
$\mathbf{v} \models \mathbf{X} f$	$\iff \forall \mathbf{v}' \in \text{val}(V), (\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}') \in \mathcal{D}, \mathbf{v}' \models f$
$\mathbf{v} \models \mathbf{F} f$	$\iff \forall \alpha \in \text{Frag}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{v}), \exists i \geq 0, \alpha[i] \models f$
$\mathbf{v} \models \mathbf{G} f$	$\iff \forall \alpha \in \text{Frag}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{v}), \forall i \geq 0, \alpha[i] \models f$
$\mathbf{v} \models f_1 \mathbf{U} f_2$	$\iff \forall \alpha \in \text{Frag}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{v}), \exists i \geq 0, \alpha[i] \models f_2 \wedge \forall j \leq i, \alpha[j] \models f_1$
$\mathbf{v} \models f_1 \mathbf{R} f_2$	$\iff \forall \alpha \in \text{Frag}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{v}), \exists i \geq 0, \alpha[i] \models f_2 \wedge \forall j \leq i, \alpha[j] \models f_1$


- Lab is a labeling function that assigns each state a set of atomic propositions

Computation Tree Logic (CTL)


- LTL \rightarrow enables us to talk about linear or sequential requirements that must hold in every execution of a system
- CTL \rightarrow allows us to describe the requirements of computational trees

Computation Tree Logic (CTL)

CTL Syntax :



CTL Semantics :



CTL*: a temporal logic that freely combines temporal operators and path quantifiers \rightarrow has much expressive power as both CTL and LTL

Further Discussions on Temporal Logics

- Given an LTL formula f , checking whether $[f] = \emptyset$ is called the **LTL satisfiability problem**
 - Aka LTL **model checking problem**
 - To answer this problem \rightarrow we check whether there is an execution that satisfies $\neg f$
 - The problem is PSPACE-complete in the size of the formula f
- CTL and LTL have been extensively used to specify requirements for the controller synthesis problem for CPS and robotic systems
 - Problem formulation looks like this: given
 1. An LTL specification for the tasks of an agent
 2. A model of the agent's movements and actions
 3. A temporal logic specification of how the environment reacts to the agent's actions
 - Construct a controller so that the agent's resulting trajectories and actions satisfy the task and environment specifications

Further Discussions on Temporal Logics

- **Metric temporal logic (MTL):** LTL augmented with timing constraints
 - $(\diamond_{(0,10)} \text{lightRed})$ means lightRed will become true sometime in the next 10 time units
- **Signal temporal logic (STL):** extends MTL to include real-valued constraints
 - $\square(x[t] < 5.5 \rightarrow (\diamond_{(0,10)} \text{lightRed}))$
- **Probabilistic CTL (PCTL)/Continuous stochastic logics(CSL):** add probabilistic operators on top of temporal logics
 - $P_{\geq 0.5}(\text{walkButton} \rightarrow (\diamond_{(0,10)} \text{lightRed}))$ means with a probability of at least 0.5, lightRed turns on within 10 time units of walkButton
 - Very useful while dealing a probabilistic model (like MDPs)



Thank You!!!